| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: ntfs3: fix infinite loop in attr_load_runs_range on inconsistent metadata
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an attribute header
indicates an empty run list, while directory entries reference it as
containing actual data. In NTFS, setting evcn=-1 with svcn=0 is a valid way
to represent an empty run list, and run_unpack() correctly handles this by
checking if evcn + 1 equals svcn and returning early without parsing any run
data. However, this creates a problem when there is metadata inconsistency,
where the attribute header claims to be empty (evcn=-1) but the caller
expects to read actual data. When run_unpack() immediately returns success
upon seeing this condition, it leaves the runs_tree uninitialized with
run->runs as a NULL. The calling function attr_load_runs_range() assumes
that a successful return means that the runs were loaded and sets clen to 0,
expecting the next run_lookup_entry() call to succeed. Because runs_tree
remains uninitialized, run_lookup_entry() continues to fail, and the loop
increments vcn by zero (vcn += 0), leading to an infinite loop.
This patch adds a retry counter to detect when run_lookup_entry() fails
consecutively after attr_load_runs_vcn(). If the run is still not found on
the second attempt, it indicates corrupted metadata and returns -EINVAL,
preventing the Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: ntfs3: fix infinite loop triggered by zero-sized ATTR_LIST
We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a
Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.
A malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an ATTR_LIST attribute
indicates a zero data size while the driver allocates memory for it.
When ntfs_load_attr_list() processes a resident ATTR_LIST with data_size set
to zero, it still allocates memory because of al_aligned(0). This creates an
inconsistent state where ni->attr_list.size is zero, but ni->attr_list.le is
non-null. This causes ni_enum_attr_ex to incorrectly assume that no attribute
list exists and enumerates only the primary MFT record. When it finds
ATTR_LIST, the code reloads it and restarts the enumeration, repeating
indefinitely. The mount operation never completes, hanging the kernel thread.
This patch adds validation to ensure that data_size is non-zero before memory
allocation. When a zero-sized ATTR_LIST is detected, the function returns
-EINVAL, preventing a DoS vulnerability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix memory allocation in nvme_pr_read_keys()
nvme_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to
calculate the allocation size for rse via struct_size(). The upper
limit is PR_KEYS_MAX (64K).
A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that
results in a 4MB allocation attempt at most, causing a warning in
the page allocator when the order exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER.
To fix this, use kvzalloc() instead of kzalloc().
This bug has the same reasoning and fix with the patch below:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/[email protected]/
Warning log:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5216 at __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216, CPU#1: syz-executor117/272
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 272 Comm: syz-executor117 Not tainted 6.19.0 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216
Code: ff 83 bd a8 fe ff ff 0a 0f 86 69 fb ff ff 0f b6 1d f9 f9 c4 04 80 fb 01 0f 87 3b 76 30 ff 83 e3 01 75 09 c6 05 e4 f9 c4 04 01 <0f> 0b 48 c7 85 70 fe ff ff 00 00 00 00 e9 8f fd ff ff 31 c0 e9 0d
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fcf450 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1ffff920001f9ea0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000b RDI: 0000000000040dc0
RBP: ffffc90000fcf648 R08: ffff88800b6c3380 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffc90000fcf840 R11: ffff88807ffad280 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000040dc0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc90000fcf620
FS: 0000555565db33c0(0000) GS:ffff8880be26c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000002000000c CR3: 0000000003b72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
alloc_pages_mpol+0x236/0x4d0 mm/mempolicy.c:2486
alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x149/0x180 mm/mempolicy.c:2557
___kmalloc_large_node+0x10c/0x140 mm/slub.c:5598
__kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x25/0xc0 mm/slub.c:5629
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5645 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x483/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:5669
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline]
nvme_pr_read_keys+0x8f/0x4c0 drivers/nvme/host/pr.c:245
blkdev_pr_read_keys block/ioctl.c:456 [inline]
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1b71/0x29b0 block/ioctl.c:730
blkdev_ioctl+0x299/0x700 block/ioctl.c:786
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1bf/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x1280/0x21b0 mnt/fuzznvme_1/fuzznvme/linux-build/v6.19/./arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x71/0x330 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fb893d3108d
Code: 28 c3 e8 46 1e 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffff61f2f38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffff61f3138 RCX: 00007fb893d3108d
RDX: 0000000020000040 RSI: 00000000c01070ce RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffff61f3138
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007ffff61f3128 R14: 00007fb893dae530 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_gate: snapshot parameters with RCU on replace
The gate action can be replaced while the hrtimer callback or dump path is
walking the schedule list.
Convert the parameters to an RCU-protected snapshot and swap updates under
tcf_lock, freeing the previous snapshot via call_rcu(). When REPLACE omits
the entry list, preserve the existing schedule so the effective state is
unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: bounds-check link_id in ieee80211_ml_reconfiguration
link_id is taken from the ML Reconfiguration element (control & 0x000f),
so it can be 0..15. link_removal_timeout[] has IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS
(15) elements, so index 15 is out-of-bounds. Skip subelements with
link_id >= IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS to avoid a stack out-of-bounds
write. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: check for deleted cursors when revalidating two btrees
The free space and inode btree repair functions will rebuild both btrees
at the same time, after which it needs to evaluate both btrees to
confirm that the corruptions are gone.
However, Jiaming Zhang ran syzbot and produced a crash in the second
xchk_allocbt call. His root-cause analysis is as follows (with minor
corrections):
In xrep_revalidate_allocbt(), xchk_allocbt() is called twice (first
for BNOBT, second for CNTBT). The cause of this issue is that the
first call nullified the cursor required by the second call.
Let's first enter xrep_revalidate_allocbt() via following call chain:
xfs_file_ioctl() ->
xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata() ->
xfs_scrub_metadata() ->
`sc->ops->repair_eval(sc)` ->
xrep_revalidate_allocbt()
xchk_allocbt() is called twice in this function. In the first call:
/* Note that sc->sm->sm_type is XFS_SCRUB_TYPE_BNOPT now */
xchk_allocbt() ->
xchk_btree() ->
`bs->scrub_rec(bs, recp)` ->
xchk_allocbt_rec() ->
xchk_allocbt_xref() ->
xchk_allocbt_xref_other()
since sm_type is XFS_SCRUB_TYPE_BNOBT, pur is set to &sc->sa.cnt_cur.
Kernel called xfs_alloc_get_rec() and returned -EFSCORRUPTED. Call
chain:
xfs_alloc_get_rec() ->
xfs_btree_get_rec() ->
xfs_btree_check_block() ->
(XFS_IS_CORRUPT || XFS_TEST_ERROR), the former is false and the latter
is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED. This should be caused by
ioctl$XFS_IOC_ERROR_INJECTION I guess.
Back to xchk_allocbt_xref_other(), after receiving -EFSCORRUPTED from
xfs_alloc_get_rec(), kernel called xchk_should_check_xref(). In this
function, *curpp (points to sc->sa.cnt_cur) is nullified.
Back to xrep_revalidate_allocbt(), since sc->sa.cnt_cur has been
nullified, it then triggered null-ptr-deref via xchk_allocbt() (second
call) -> xchk_btree().
So. The bnobt revalidation failed on a cross-reference attempt, so we
deleted the cntbt cursor, and then crashed when we tried to revalidate
the cntbt. Therefore, check for a null cntbt cursor before that
revalidation, and mark the repair incomplete. Also we can ignore the
second tree entirely if the first tree was rebuilt but is already
corrupt.
Apply the same fix to xrep_revalidate_iallocbt because it has the same
problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: check return value of xchk_scrub_create_subord
Fix this function to return NULL instead of a mangled ENOMEM, then fix
the callers to actually check for a null pointer and return ENOMEM.
Most of the corrections here are for code merged between 6.2 and 6.10. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: only call xf{array,blob}_destroy if we have a valid pointer
Only call the xfarray and xfblob destructor if we have a valid pointer,
and be sure to null out that pointer afterwards. Note that this patch
fixes a large number of commits, most of which were merged between 6.9
and 6.10. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: get rid of the xchk_xfile_*_descr calls
The xchk_xfile_*_descr macros call kasprintf, which can fail to allocate
memory if the formatted string is larger than 16 bytes (or whatever the
nofail guarantees are nowadays). Some of them could easily exceed that,
and Jiaming Zhang found a few places where that can happen with syzbot.
The descriptions are debugging aids and aren't required to be unique, so
let's just pass in static strings and eliminate this path to failure.
Note this patch touches a number of commits, most of which were merged
between 6.6 and 6.14. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen
dvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the
DVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which
reinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.
Since dmxdev->dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the
same DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries
from io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers
while the list head is reset to {self, self}.
The waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly
initialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to
reset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.
Replace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct
assignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which
properly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering
without touching the waitqueue or spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix reservation leak in some error paths when inserting inline extent
If we fail to allocate a path or join a transaction, we return from
__cow_file_range_inline() without freeing the reserved qgroup data,
resulting in a leak. Fix this by ensuring we call btrfs_qgroup_free_data()
in such cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: do not free data reservation in fallback from inline due to -ENOSPC
If we fail to create an inline extent due to -ENOSPC, we will attempt to
go through the normal COW path, reserve an extent, create an ordered
extent, etc. However we were always freeing the reserved qgroup data,
which is wrong since we will use data. Fix this by freeing the reserved
qgroup data in __cow_file_range_inline() only if we are not doing the
fallback (ret is <= 0). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Enable exception fixup for specific ADE subcode
This patch allows the LoongArch BPF JIT to handle recoverable memory
access errors generated by BPF_PROBE_MEM* instructions.
When a BPF program performs memory access operations, the instructions
it executes may trigger ADEM exceptions. The kernel’s built-in BPF
exception table mechanism (EX_TYPE_BPF) will generate corresponding
exception fixup entries in the JIT compilation phase; however, the
architecture-specific trap handling function needs to proactively call
the common fixup routine to achieve exception recovery.
do_ade(): fix EX_TYPE_BPF memory access exceptions for BPF programs,
ensure safe execution.
Relevant test cases: illegal address access tests in module_attach and
subprogs_extable of selftests/bpf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gro: fix outer network offset
The udp GRO complete stage assumes that all the packets inserted the RX
have the `encapsulation` flag zeroed. Such assumption is not true, as a
few H/W NICs can set such flag when H/W offloading the checksum for
an UDP encapsulated traffic, the tun driver can inject GSO packets with
UDP encapsulation and the problematic layout can also be created via
a veth based setup.
Due to the above, in the problematic scenarios, udp4_gro_complete() uses
the wrong network offset (inner instead of outer) to compute the outer
UDP header pseudo checksum, leading to csum validation errors later on
in packet processing.
Address the issue always clearing the encapsulation flag at GRO completion
time. Such flag will be set again as needed for encapsulated packets by
udp_gro_complete(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add proper RCU protection to /proc/net/ptype
Yin Fengwei reported an RCU stall in ptype_seq_show() and provided
a patch.
Real issue is that ptype_seq_next() and ptype_seq_show() violate
RCU rules.
ptype_seq_show() runs under rcu_read_lock(), and reads pt->dev
to get device name without any barrier.
At the same time, concurrent writers can remove a packet_type structure
(which is correctly freed after an RCU grace period) and clear pt->dev
without an RCU grace period.
Define ptype_iter_state to carry a dev pointer along seq_net_private:
struct ptype_iter_state {
struct seq_net_private p;
struct net_device *dev; // added in this patch
};
We need to record the device pointer in ptype_get_idx() and
ptype_seq_next() so that ptype_seq_show() is safe against
concurrent pt->dev changes.
We also need to add full RCU protection in ptype_seq_next().
(Missing READ_ONCE() when reading list.next values)
Many thanks to Dong Chenchen for providing a repro. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: liquidio: Fix off-by-one error in VF setup_nic_devices() cleanup
In setup_nic_devices(), the initialization loop jumps to the label
setup_nic_dev_free on failure. The current cleanup loop while(i--)
skip the failing index i, causing a memory leak.
Fix this by changing the loop to iterate from the current index i
down to 0.
Compile tested only. Issue found using code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: liquidio: Fix off-by-one error in PF setup_nic_devices() cleanup
In setup_nic_devices(), the initialization loop jumps to the label
setup_nic_dev_free on failure. The current cleanup loop while(i--)
skip the failing index i, causing a memory leak.
Fix this by changing the loop to iterate from the current index i
down to 0.
Also, decrement i in the devlink_alloc failure path to point to the
last successfully allocated index.
Compile tested only. Issue found using code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: liquidio: Initialize netdev pointer before queue setup
In setup_nic_devices(), the netdev is allocated using alloc_etherdev_mq().
However, the pointer to this structure is stored in oct->props[i].netdev
only after the calls to netif_set_real_num_rx_queues() and
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues().
If either of these functions fails, setup_nic_devices() returns an error
without freeing the allocated netdev. Since oct->props[i].netdev is still
NULL at this point, the cleanup function liquidio_destroy_nic_device()
will fail to find and free the netdev, resulting in a memory leak.
Fix this by initializing oct->props[i].netdev before calling the queue
setup functions. This ensures that the netdev is properly accessible for
cleanup in case of errors.
Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rw: free potentially allocated iovec on cache put failure
If a read/write request goes through io_req_rw_cleanup() and has an
allocated iovec attached and fails to put to the rw_cache, then it may
end up with an unaccounted iovec pointer. Have io_rw_recycle() return
whether it recycled the request or not, and use that to gauge whether to
free a potential iovec or not. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regmap: maple: free entry on mas_store_gfp() failure
regcache_maple_write() allocates a new block ('entry') to merge
adjacent ranges and then stores it with mas_store_gfp().
When mas_store_gfp() fails, the new 'entry' remains allocated and
is never freed, leaking memory.
Free 'entry' on the failure path; on success continue freeing the
replaced neighbor blocks ('lower', 'upper'). |
