| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: release path before iget_failed() in btrfs_read_locked_inode()
In btrfs_read_locked_inode() if we fail to lookup the inode, we jump to
the 'out' label with a path that has a read locked leaf and then we call
iget_failed(). This can result in a ABBA deadlock, since iget_failed()
triggers inode eviction and that causes the release of the delayed inode,
which must lock the delayed inode's mutex, and a task updating a delayed
inode starts by taking the node's mutex and then modifying the inode's
subvolume btree.
Syzbot reported the following lockdep splat for this:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
btrfs-cleaner/8725 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff0000d6826a48 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0xa0/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:290
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000dbeba878 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x44/0x2ec fs/btrfs/locking.c:145
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{4:4}:
__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5574 [inline]
lock_release+0x198/0x39c kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5889
up_read+0x24/0x3c kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1632
btrfs_tree_read_unlock+0xdc/0x298 fs/btrfs/locking.c:169
btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:218 [inline]
btrfs_search_slot+0xa6c/0x223c fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2133
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xd8/0x38c fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:395
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x124/0xed0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1032
btrfs_update_delayed_inode fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1118 [inline]
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x15f8/0x1748 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1141
__btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1ac/0x514 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1176
btrfs_run_delayed_items_nr+0x28/0x38 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1219
flush_space+0x26c/0xb68 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:828
do_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x110/0x364 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1158
btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x90/0xd8 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1226
process_one_work+0x7e8/0x155c kernel/workqueue.c:3263
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3346 [inline]
worker_thread+0x958/0xed8 kernel/workqueue.c:3427
kthread+0x5fc/0x75c kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:844
-> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1774/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x14c/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common+0x1d0/0x2678 kernel/locking/mutex.c:598
__mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:760 [inline]
mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x38 kernel/locking/mutex.c:812
__btrfs_release_delayed_node+0xa0/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:290
btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:315 [inline]
btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x68/0x84 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1326
btrfs_evict_inode+0x578/0xe28 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5587
evict+0x414/0x928 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput+0x95c/0xad4 fs/inode.c:1966
iget_failed+0xec/0x134 fs/bad_inode.c:248
btrfs_read_locked_inode+0xe1c/0x1234 fs/btrfs/inode.c:4101
btrfs_iget+0x1b0/0x264 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5837
btrfs_run_defrag_inode fs/btrfs/defrag.c:237 [inline]
btrfs_run_defrag_inodes+0x520/0xdc4 fs/btrf
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev instead of priv
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.
Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.
On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv->profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.
This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.
$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS: 00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
device_del+0x160/0x3d0
? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/userq: Fix fence reference leak on queue teardown v2
The user mode queue keeps a pointer to the most recent fence in
userq->last_fence. This pointer holds an extra dma_fence reference.
When the queue is destroyed, we free the fence driver and its xarray,
but we forgot to drop the last_fence reference.
Because of the missing dma_fence_put(), the last fence object can stay
alive when the driver unloads. This leaves an allocated object in the
amdgpu_userq_fence slab cache and triggers
This is visible during driver unload as:
BUG amdgpu_userq_fence: Objects remaining on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
kmem_cache_destroy amdgpu_userq_fence: Slab cache still has objects
Call Trace:
kmem_cache_destroy
amdgpu_userq_fence_slab_fini
amdgpu_exit
__do_sys_delete_module
Fix this by putting userq->last_fence and clearing the pointer during
amdgpu_userq_fence_driver_free().
This makes sure the fence reference is released and the slab cache is
empty when the module exits.
v2: Update to only release userq->last_fence with dma_fence_put()
(Christian)
(cherry picked from commit 8e051e38a8d45caf6a866d4ff842105b577953bb) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: omap-dma: fix dma_pool resource leak in error paths
The dma_pool created by dma_pool_create() is not destroyed when
dma_async_device_register() or of_dma_controller_register() fails,
causing a resource leak in the probe error paths.
Add dma_pool_destroy() in both error paths to properly release the
allocated dma_pool resource. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
null_blk: fix kmemleak by releasing references to fault configfs items
When CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK_FAULT_INJECTION is enabled, the null-blk
driver sets up fault injection support by creating the timeout_inject,
requeue_inject, and init_hctx_fault_inject configfs items as children
of the top-level nullbX configfs group.
However, when the nullbX device is removed, the references taken to
these fault-config configfs items are not released. As a result,
kmemleak reports a memory leak, for example:
unreferenced object 0xc00000021ff25c40 (size 32):
comm "mkdir", pid 10665, jiffies 4322121578
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
69 6e 69 74 5f 68 63 74 78 5f 66 61 75 6c 74 5f init_hctx_fault_
69 6e 6a 65 63 74 00 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 inject..........
backtrace (crc 1a018c86):
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x494/0xbd8
kvasprintf+0x74/0xf4
config_item_set_name+0xf0/0x104
config_group_init_type_name+0x48/0xfc
fault_config_init+0x48/0xf0
0xc0080000180559e4
configfs_mkdir+0x304/0x814
vfs_mkdir+0x49c/0x604
do_mkdirat+0x314/0x3d0
sys_mkdir+0xa0/0xd8
system_call_exception+0x1b0/0x4f0
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
Fix this by explicitly releasing the references to the fault-config
configfs items when dropping the reference to the top-level nullbX
configfs group. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
In gs_can_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to the
parent->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(), the URB is processed and resubmitted. In
gs_can_close() the URBs are freed by calling
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(parent->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in gs_can_close().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() to the parent->rx_submitted anchor. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: rockchip: inno-usb2: Fix a double free bug in rockchip_usb2phy_probe()
The for_each_available_child_of_node() calls of_node_put() to
release child_np in each success loop. After breaking from the
loop with the child_np has been released, the code will jump to
the put_child label and will call the of_node_put() again if the
devm_request_threaded_irq() fails. These cause a double free bug.
Fix by returning directly to avoid the duplicate of_node_put(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Fix kvm_device leak in kvm_eiointc_destroy()
In kvm_ioctl_create_device(), kvm_device has allocated memory,
kvm_device->destroy() seems to be supposed to free its kvm_device
struct, but kvm_eiointc_destroy() is not currently doing this, that
would lead to a memory leak.
So, fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Fix kvm_device leak in kvm_ipi_destroy()
In kvm_ioctl_create_device(), kvm_device has allocated memory,
kvm_device->destroy() seems to be supposed to free its kvm_device
struct, but kvm_ipi_destroy() is not currently doing this, that
would lead to a memory leak.
So, fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Fix kvm_device leak in kvm_pch_pic_destroy()
In kvm_ioctl_create_device(), kvm_device has allocated memory,
kvm_device->destroy() seems to be supposed to free its kvm_device
struct, but kvm_pch_pic_destroy() is not currently doing this, that
would lead to a memory leak.
So, fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: at91-sama5d2_adc: Fix potential use-after-free in sama5d2_adc driver
at91_adc_interrupt can call at91_adc_touch_data_handler function
to start the work by schedule_work(&st->touch_st.workq).
If we remove the module which will call at91_adc_remove to
make cleanup, it will free indio_dev through iio_device_unregister but
quite a bit later. While the work mentioned above will be used. The
sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows:
CPU0 CPU1
| at91_adc_workq_handler
at91_adc_remove |
iio_device_unregister(indio_dev) |
//free indio_dev a bit later |
| iio_push_to_buffers(indio_dev)
| //use indio_dev
Fix it by ensuring that the work is canceled before proceeding with
the cleanup in at91_adc_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix iio_chan_spec for sensors without event detection
The st_lsm6dsx_acc_channels array of struct iio_chan_spec has a non-NULL
event_spec field, indicating support for IIO events. However, event
detection is not supported for all sensors, and if userspace tries to
configure accelerometer wakeup events on a sensor device that does not
support them (e.g. LSM6DS0), st_lsm6dsx_write_event() dereferences a NULL
pointer when trying to write to the wakeup register.
Define an additional struct iio_chan_spec array whose members have a NULL
event_spec field, and use this array instead of st_lsm6dsx_acc_channels for
sensors without event detection capability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
w1: therm: Fix off-by-one buffer overflow in alarms_store
The sysfs buffer passed to alarms_store() is allocated with 'size + 1'
bytes and a NUL terminator is appended. However, the 'size' argument
does not account for this extra byte. The original code then allocated
'size' bytes and used strcpy() to copy 'buf', which always writes one
byte past the allocated buffer since strcpy() copies until the NUL
terminator at index 'size'.
Fix this by parsing the 'buf' parameter directly using simple_strtoll()
without allocating any intermediate memory or string copying. This
removes the overflow while simplifying the code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: stm32-usphyc: Fix off by one in probe()
The "index" variable is used as an index into the usbphyc->phys[] array
which has usbphyc->nphys elements. So if it is equal to usbphyc->nphys
then it is one element out of bounds. The "index" comes from the
device tree so it's data that we trust and it's unlikely to be wrong,
however it's obviously still worth fixing the bug. Change the > to >=. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx: xdma: Fix regmap max_register
The max_register field is assigned the size of the register memory
region instead of the offset of the last register.
The result is that reading from the regmap via debugfs can cause
a segmentation fault:
tail /sys/kernel/debug/regmap/xdma.1.auto/registers
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800082f70000
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000007
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[...]
Call trace:
regmap_mmio_read32le+0x10/0x30
_regmap_bus_reg_read+0x74/0xc0
_regmap_read+0x68/0x198
regmap_read+0x54/0x88
regmap_read_debugfs+0x140/0x380
regmap_map_read_file+0x30/0x48
full_proxy_read+0x68/0xc8
vfs_read+0xcc/0x310
ksys_read+0x7c/0x120
__arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x40
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x64/0x108
do_el0_svc+0xb0/0xd8
el0_svc+0x38/0x130
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x138
el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
Code: aa1e03e9 d503201f f9400000 8b214000 (b9400000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
note: tail[1217] exited with irqs disabled
note: tail[1217] exited with preempt_count 1
Segmentation fault |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix deadlock in wait_current_trans() due to ignored transaction type
When wait_current_trans() is called during start_transaction(), it
currently waits for a blocked transaction without considering whether
the given transaction type actually needs to wait for that particular
transaction state. The btrfs_blocked_trans_types[] array already defines
which transaction types should wait for which transaction states, but
this check was missing in wait_current_trans().
This can lead to a deadlock scenario involving two transactions and
pending ordered extents:
1. Transaction A is in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state
2. A worker processing an ordered extent calls start_transaction()
with TRANS_JOIN
3. join_transaction() returns -EBUSY because Transaction A is in
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING
4. Transaction A moves to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED and completes
5. A new Transaction B is created (TRANS_STATE_RUNNING)
6. The ordered extent from step 2 is added to Transaction B's
pending ordered extents
7. Transaction B immediately starts commit by another task and
enters TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
8. The worker finally reaches wait_current_trans(), sees Transaction B
in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START (a blocked state), and waits
unconditionally
9. However, TRANS_JOIN should NOT wait for TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
according to btrfs_blocked_trans_types[]
10. Transaction B is waiting for pending ordered extents to complete
11. Deadlock: Transaction B waits for ordered extent, ordered extent
waits for Transaction B
This can be illustrated by the following call stacks:
CPU0 CPU1
btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
start_transaction(TRANS_JOIN)
join_transaction()
# -EBUSY (Transaction A is
# TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING)
# Transaction A completes
# Transaction B created
# ordered extent added to
# Transaction B's pending list
btrfs_commit_transaction()
# Transaction B enters
# TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
# waiting for pending ordered
# extents
wait_current_trans()
# waits for Transaction B
# (should not wait!)
Task bstore_kv_sync in btrfs_commit_transaction waiting for ordered
extents:
__schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
schedule+0x64/0xe0
btrfs_commit_transaction+0xbf7/0xda0 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_file+0x342/0x4d0 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4b/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Task kworker in wait_current_trans waiting for transaction commit:
Workqueue: btrfs-syno_nocow btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
__schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
schedule+0x64/0xe0
wait_current_trans+0xb0/0x110 [btrfs]
start_transaction+0x346/0x5b0 [btrfs]
btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0x49b/0x9c0 [btrfs]
btrfs_work_helper+0xe8/0x350 [btrfs]
process_one_work+0x1d3/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
kthread+0x12d/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Fix this by passing the transaction type to wait_current_trans() and
checking btrfs_blocked_trans_types[cur_trans->state] against the given
type before deciding to wait. This ensures that transaction types which
are allowed to join during certain blocked states will not unnecessarily
wait and cause deadlocks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: qcom-qusb2: Fix NULL pointer dereference on early suspend
Enabling runtime PM before attaching the QPHY instance as driver data
can lead to a NULL pointer dereference in runtime PM callbacks that
expect valid driver data. There is a small window where the suspend
callback may run after PM runtime enabling and before runtime forbid.
This causes a sporadic crash during boot:
```
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a1
[...]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.16.7+ #116 PREEMPT
Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : qusb2_phy_runtime_suspend+0x14/0x1e0 [phy_qcom_qusb2]
lr : pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x2c/0x44
[...]
```
Attach the QPHY instance as driver data before enabling runtime PM to
prevent NULL pointer dereference in runtime PM callbacks.
Reorder pm_runtime_enable() and pm_runtime_forbid() to prevent a
short window where an unnecessary runtime suspend can occur.
Use the devres-managed version to ensure PM runtime is symmetrically
disabled during driver removal for proper cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ac97: fix a double free in snd_ac97_controller_register()
If ac97_add_adapter() fails, put_device() is the correct way to drop
the device reference. kfree() is not required.
Add kfree() if idr_alloc() fails and in ac97_adapter_release() to do
the cleanup.
Found by code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: Use spinlock for context list protection lock
Previously a mutex was added to protect the encoder and decoder context
lists from unexpected changes originating from the SCP IP block, causing
the context pointer to go invalid, resulting in a NULL pointer
dereference in the IPI handler.
Turns out on the MT8173, the VPU IPI handler is called from hard IRQ
context. This causes a big warning from the scheduler. This was first
reported downstream on the ChromeOS kernels, but is also reproducible
on mainline using Fluster with the FFmpeg v4l2m2m decoders. Even though
the actual capture format is not supported, the affected code paths
are triggered.
Since this lock just protects the context list and operations on it are
very fast, it should be OK to switch to a spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: clean up user copy references on ublk server exit
If a ublk server process releases a ublk char device file, any requests
dispatched to the ublk server but not yet completed will retain a ref
value of UBLK_REFCOUNT_INIT. Before commit e63d2228ef83 ("ublk: simplify
aborting ublk request"), __ublk_fail_req() would decrement the reference
count before completing the failed request. However, that commit
optimized __ublk_fail_req() to call __ublk_complete_rq() directly
without decrementing the request reference count.
The leaked reference count incorrectly allows user copy and zero copy
operations on the completed ublk request. It also triggers the
WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&io->ref)) warnings in ublk_queue_reinit()
and ublk_deinit_queue().
Commit c5c5eb24ed61 ("ublk: avoid ublk_io_release() called after ublk
char dev is closed") already fixed the issue for ublk devices using
UBLK_F_SUPPORT_ZERO_COPY or UBLK_F_AUTO_BUF_REG. However, the reference
count leak also affects UBLK_F_USER_COPY, the other reference-counted
data copy mode. Fix the condition in ublk_check_and_reset_active_ref()
to include all reference-counted data copy modes. This ensures that any
ublk requests still owned by the ublk server when it exits have their
reference counts reset to 0. |
