| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Insufficiently protected credentials in Azure DevOps allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to version 4.5.2, in Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret. If the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue. |
| Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to version 4.5.2, in Central Browser mode, Glances stores both the Zeroconf-advertised server name and the discovered IP address for dynamic servers, but later builds connection URIs from the untrusted advertised name instead of the discovered IP. When a dynamic server reports itself as protected, Glances also uses that same untrusted name as the lookup key for saved passwords and the global `[passwords] default` credential. An attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service over Zeroconf and cause the browser to automatically send a reusable Glances authentication secret to an attacker-controlled host. This affects the background polling path and the REST/WebUI click-through path in Central Browser mode. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue. |
| IncusOS is an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus. Prior to 202603142010, the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened. This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition. IncusOS version 202603142010 (2026/03/14 20:10 UTC) includes the new PCR15 logic and will automatically update the TPM policy on boot. Anyone suspecting that their system may have been physically accessed while shut down should perform a full system wipe and reinstallation as only that will rotate the LUKS volume key and prevent subsequent access to the encrypted data should the system have been previously compromised. There are no known workarounds other than updating to a version with corrected logic which will automatically rebind the LUKS keys to the new set of TPM registers and prevent this from being exploited. |
| Unnecessary transmission of sensitive cryptographic material. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 17 (Linux, Windows) before build 41186. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
| When an OAuth2 bearer token is used for an HTTP(S) transfer, and that transfer
performs a redirect to a second URL, curl could leak that token to the second
hostname under some circumstances.
If the hostname that the first request is redirected to has information in the
used .netrc file, with either of the `machine` or `default` keywords, curl
would pass on the bearer token set for the first host also to the second one. |
| Password Confirmation Bypass vulnerability in Omada Controllers, allowing an attacker with a valid session token to bypass secondary verification, and change the user’s password without proper confirmation, leading to weakened account security. |
| Ksenia Security lares (legacy model) Home Automation version 1.6 contains an unprotected endpoint vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to upload MPFS File System binary images. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to overwrite flash program memory and potentially execute arbitrary code on the home automation system's web server. |
| DSA Study Hub is an interactive educational web application. Prior to commit d527fba, the user authentication system in server/routes/auth.js was found to be vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials. Authentication tokens (JWTs) were stored in HTTP cookies without cryptographic protection of the payload. This issue has been patched via commit d527fba. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
| IDC SFX2100 Satellite Receiver firmware ships with multiple daemon configuration files for routing components (e.g., zebra, bgpd, ospfd, and ripd) that are owned by root but world-readable. The configuration files (e.g., zebra.conf, bgpd.conf, ospfd.conf, ripd.conf) contain hardcoded or otherwise insecure plaintext passwords (including “enable”/privileged-mode credentials). A remote actor is able to abuse the reuse/hardcoded nature of these credentials to further access other systems in the network, gain a foothold on the satellite receiver or potentially locally privilege escalate. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
| Storing Passwords in a Recoverable Format in GitHub repository pimcore/customer-data-framework prior to 3.3.10. |
| Rockwell Automation Studio 5000 Logix Designer Versions 21 and later, and RSLogix 5000 Versions 16 through 20 use a key to verify Logix controllers are communicating with Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 1768, 1769, 5370, 5380, 5480: ControlLogix 5550, 5560, 5570, 5580; DriveLogix 5560, 5730, 1794-L34; Compact GuardLogix 5370, 5380; GuardLogix 5570, 5580; SoftLogix 5800. Rockwell Automation Studio 5000 Logix Designer Versions 21 and later and RSLogix 5000: Versions 16 through 20 are vulnerable because an unauthenticated attacker could bypass this verification mechanism and authenticate with Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 1768, 1769, 5370, 5380, 5480: ControlLogix 5550, 5560, 5570, 5580; DriveLogix 5560, 5730, 1794-L34; Compact GuardLogix 5370, 5380; GuardLogix 5570, 5580; SoftLogix 5800. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
| Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms. |
